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I. INTRODUCTION 
The venerable doctrine of collateral estoppel1 is currently in a 
state of flux.2  The ever-increasing expense of operating the judicial 
system3 urges expanded use of the doctrine, while due process 
concerns remain a limiting factor.4  The recent Minnesota Supreme 
Court case of Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Reed5 dealt with two 
different aspects of collateral estoppel: who may be considered to 
be in privity with a criminal defendant and whether a criminal 
conviction will generally be given estoppel effect.6  Reed held that a 
criminal conviction cannot be used by an insurance company to 
collaterally estop a civil plaintiff from proving that the criminal 
defendant’s act was unintentional.7  Thus, the civil plaintiff is 
allowed to prove the convicted criminal defendant’s lack of intent, 
and thereby escape the intentional-act exclusion in the defendant’s 
insurance policy.8 
This Note first examines the goals and history of the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel, including the great changes the doctrine has 
undergone of late.9  It then examines the facts of the Reed case, 
details the procedural history of the case, and outlines the analysis 
of the courts in deciding the case.10  This Note then analyzes both 
the successes and the failures of the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
the Reed opinion.11  Finally, this Note concludes that the Reed 
decision is correct in its privity and due process analyses, but falls 
 
 1. Collateral estoppel is defined as “[t]he binding effect of a judgment as to 
matters actually litigated and determined in one action on later controversies 
between the parties involving a different claim from that on which the original 
judgment was based.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 2004). 
 2. See generally Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002), rev’d, 662 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 2003) (discussing the widening scope of the 
use of criminal convictions for collateral estoppel). 
 3. The February 2004 Minnesota budget forecast estimates that the state trial 
courts will cost $371,920,000 to run in 2004.  Minn. Dep’t of Fin., February 2004 
General Fund Statement-Detail 15 (Feb. 27, 2004), at http://www.budget.state.mn.us/ 
budget/summary/index.shtml. 
 4. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (“It is a 
violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who . . . has 
never had an opportunity to be heard.”). 
 5. 662 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 2003). 
 6. Id. at 533-34. 
 7. Id. at 534. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
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short by failing to clarify what collateral estoppel effect a criminal 




A. Collateral Estoppel and Related Doctrines 
 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has long been a part of 
both English and United States common law.13  Courts in the U.S. 
recognized this doctrine at least as early as 1876.14  During the late 
twentieth century, the doctrine of collateral estoppel has seen 
major changes.15  Generally, these changes have increased the 
scope of situations in which collateral estoppel can be applied.16 
Collateral estoppel, as with the related doctrines of res 
judicata,17 law of the case,18 and stare decisis,19 has as its goal the 
promotion of stability, predictability, and consistency.20  These 
 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 14. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877) (differentiating between 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel). 
 15. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1116 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 16. Id.  Today, Minnesota courts allow the use of collateral estoppel when 
four conditions are met: (1) the issue to be collaterally estopped is identical to one 
previously adjudicated, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party 
to be estopped was a party or is in privity with a party in the prior adjudication, 
and (4) the estopped party had opportunity to be heard.  Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. 
Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Minn. 2003). 
 17. Literally, “a thing adjudicated,” “res judicata” refers to “[a]n affirmative 
defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same 
claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of 
transactions and that could have been – but was not – raised in the first suit.”  
BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 1336-37. 
 18. Law of the case refers to “[t]he doctrine holding that a decision rendered 
in a former appeal of a case is binding in a later appeal.”  Id. at 903. 
 19. Literally “to stand by things decided,” stare decisis is “[t]he doctrine of 
precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial 
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”  Id. at 1443. 
 20. See ROGER C. PARK & DOUGLAS D. MCFARLAND, COMPUTER-AIDED EXERCISES 
ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 214-15 (4th ed. 1995).  In addition, res judicata and collateral 
estoppel are both based on several policies protecting both public and private 
interests.  Id.  By preventing re-litigation of claims and issues, these doctrines 
protect the prevailing party’s interest in the judgment, and at the same time 
prevent the additional emotional and financial burden of litigation.  Id. at 215.  In 
the public sphere, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are 
necessary to prevent a court’s judgment from becoming a mere “empty gesture.”  
Id.  They also promote judicial efficiency and open up the courts to those with new 
3
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doctrines differ, however, in how they seek to promote these goals.  
Collateral estoppel seeks to prevent parties and their privities from 
re-litigating an issue that has already been actually litigated and 
that was necessary to the prior judgment, though the prior claim 
was different.21  Res judicata, as opposed to the narrower collateral 
estoppel, is a “broad sword that has more capability to prevent 
litigation.”22  It prevents parties and their privities from re-litigating 
an entire claim, including all issues within that claim that were or 
should have been litigated in the prior suit.23  Law of the case, 
unlike both res judicata and collateral estoppel, works within a 
single case rather than in two cases.24  It provides that appellate 
court decisions are binding on lower courts, as well as on the 
appellate courts themselves, by self-restraint, if the case returns on 
another appeal.25  Finally, stare decisis applies to different parties 
than those in the original litigation.26  It uses results from one case 
to aid in determining the outcome of another case.27  Stare decisis 
is persuasive rather than binding like the other doctrines.28 
The terminology used to refer to the doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel is far from uniform in the law.29  Therefore, 
a note about vocabulary is in order.  The term “res judicata” may 
refer to preclusion of issues as well as to preclusion of entire 
claims.30  Other times “res judicata” refers only to preclusion of 
claims.31  Thus, “res judicata” can be synonymous with “claim 
 
claims and issues to litigate.  Id.  Finally, these doctrines are concerned with 
preserving the integrity of the judicial system by preventing inconsistent results 
from case to case.  Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2002), rev’d, 662 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 2003).  These benefits do come at a cost, 
however.  The primary cost of these policy considerations is that the claims and 
issues are precluded regardless of their merits.  PARK & MCFARLAND, supra, at 215.  
Thus, these doctrines reflect the policy that “sometimes it is more important that a 
judgment be stable than that it be correct.”  FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 
§ 14.3 at 619 (2d ed. 1993). 
 21. PARK & MCFARLAND, supra note 20, at 214. 
 22. Ryan R. Dreyer, Case Note, Discouraging Declaratory Actions in Minnesota: 
The Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Judgments in Light of State v. Joseph, 29 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 613, 618 (2002). 
 23. PARK & MCFARLAND, supra note 20, at 214. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 215. 
 29. Id. at 213. 
 30. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 1114. 
 31. Dreyer, supra note 22, at 618-19.  The fact that the term “merger and bar” 
4
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preclusion,” and “collateral estoppel” can be synonymous with 
“issue preclusion.”32  As used in this note, “res judicata” will refer 
only to preclusion of entire claims, and “collateral estoppel” will 
refer to preclusion of issues. 
 
B. Changes in Collateral Estoppel Law 
 
1. The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Criminal Judgments Generally 
 
Traditionally, courts have not afforded criminal judgments the 
same collateral estoppel effect as civil judgments.33  Indeed, the 
historical practice was to give criminal judgments no collateral 
estoppel effect whatsoever.34  But in the last thirty years, courts have 
been increasingly willing to use prior criminal convictions to 
collaterally estop issues in subsequent civil litigation.35  This shift 
was caused by the erosion of several historical objections to this 
type of collateral estoppel.36  In addition, several other factors 
weigh strongly in favor of granting criminal convictions general 
collateral estoppel effect.37 
a. Historical Objections to Giving Criminal Judgments 
Collateral Estoppel Effect 
One traditional objection to the use of criminal convictions for 
collateral estoppel purposes was the now-defunct evidentiary rule 
that an interested person could not testify in a civil case.38  
Therefore, if the victim of a crime testified in the criminal trial, and 
the perpetrator of the crime was convicted, then that conviction 
 
is often used interchangeably with “res judicata” or “claim preclusion” further 
complicates the issue.  MARCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 1114-15. 
 32. “Courts tend to use res judicata and collateral estoppel, while the 
Restatement and some academics use claim and issue preclusion, respectively.”  
Dreyer, supra note 22, at 617 n.31. 
 33. See generally Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See generally Beth Boggs & Dan McLaughlin, Criminal Convictions Do Not 
Equal Intentional Acts: A Review of Illinois Law on the Collateral Effects of Criminal 
Convictions in Civil Proceedings, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 281 (2001) (surveying various 
jurisdictions’ treatment of the use of collateral estoppel in civil proceedings based 
on prior criminal convictions). 
 36. See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 560-63. 
 37. Id. at 562. 
 38. Id. at 560. 
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could not be used in a subsequent civil trial brought by the victim.39  
If it were used, the victim would essentially be testifying in the civil 
trial because his testimony contributed to the prior conviction, and 
the conviction would be used in the civil trial.40  Though this 
evidentiary rule has not been in effect for some 150 years,41 the rule 
against using criminal convictions for collateral estoppel purposes 
continued long thereafter.42 
Historically, the courts have also objected to the use of 
criminal convictions for collateral estoppel purposes because of the 
mutuality requirement.43  Early courts considering the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel insisted that the parties in the first suit be 
identical to those in the second suit.44  This requirement was based 
on principles of fairness: it would be unfair to allow a party to use 
collateral estoppel against his opponent if he himself would not 
have been bound by the judgment had the judgment come out 
differently.45  A criminal defendant cannot use the fact of his 
acquittal in a later civil action “because an acquittal is a finding that 
the fact was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt and the civil 
burden of proof requires only a fair preponderance of the 
evidence.”46  Therefore, mutuality dictated that a criminal 
defendant that is convicted cannot be estopped in a subsequent 
civil trial.  Thus, the mutuality requirement served to prevent 
criminal convictions from being granted collateral estoppel effect.47 
The courts and the legal community frequently criticized the 
mutuality requirement.48  On the strength of this criticism, the U.S. 
Supreme Court abandoned the requirement of mutuality in 1971.49  
 
 39. See id. at 560-61. 
 40. See id. 
 41. This evidentiary rule was done away with by the Evidentiary Act of 1843.  
Id. at 560. 
 42. Id. at 560-61. 
 43. Id. at 561. 
 44. See generally E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Comment Note – Mutuality of 
Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the 
Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970). 
 45. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979). 
 46. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327; see also Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. 
Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942) (“No satisfactory rationalization 
has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality.  Just why a party who was not 
bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata 
against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend.”). 
 49. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court abandoned the mutuality 
requirement, at least for a limited class of cases, as early as 1955.50  
Today, the mutuality requirement is effectively a dead letter.51  Of 
course, though courts no longer require mutuality, due process 
mandates that the party to be bound by the prior judgment must 
have been a party (or in privity with a party) in the prior action.52  
Thus, at the time Reed was decided, the mutuality requirement had 
already been abandoned in Minnesota, as it had been in almost 
every other jurisdiction.53 
A third objection to using criminal convictions for collateral 
estoppel purposes was the notion that a criminal verdict was 
nothing more than the opinion of the jurors, and was therefore 
hearsay.54  This objection is invalid for two reasons.55  First, whether 
or not evidence is hearsay is germane to its admissibility, rather 
than to its collateral estoppel effect.56  Second, if this objection was 
heeded, no judgment could be given collateral estoppel effect 
because all judgments are simply the opinion of another court or 
jury.57 
A final historical objection to giving criminal convictions 
collateral estoppel effect is simple obedience to stare decisis.58  
Some courts continued to deny criminal convictions collateral 
estoppel effect simply because precedent called for it.59  This is 
likely the reason that this rule continued for so long after the 
 
 50. Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955). 
 51. B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1967).  See generally 
Schopler, supra note 44.  With the abandonment of the mutuality requirement, 
most courts have accepted the use of both defensive and offensive non-mutual 
collateral estoppel.  Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 563.  Defensive collateral estoppel would 
apply, for example, if “A sues B for patent infringement.  Following full litigation, 
the court adjudges the patent invalid.  A then sues C for infringement of the same 
patent.  C pleads collateral estoppel against A on the issue of the validity of the 
patent.  C is using collateral estoppel defensively . . . .”  PARK & MCFARLAND, supra 
note 20, at 222.  Offensive collateral estoppel, on the other hand, might occur 
where A, B, and C all live on property abutting a lake.  A sues X for dumping 
toxins in the lake; A is successful.  Then B and C sue X for the same incident, and 
assert collateral estoppel to prevent X from re-litigating the dumping.  See id. at 
222-23. 
 52. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327. 
 53. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561, 565. 
 54. Id. at 563. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 179 N.E. 711, 712 (N.Y. 1932). 
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original reasons for it were no longer viable.  Of course, once a 
legal rule becomes anachronistic and unnecessary, stare decisis 
should not dictate the continued practice of that rule.  Thus, by the 
time of the Reed decision, the historical reasons that criminal 
convictions could not be used for collateral estoppel had all ceased 
to be present in the law.60 
b. Additional Arguments in Favor of Giving Criminal 
Judgments Collateral Estoppel Effect 
The historical objections to using criminal convictions for 
collateral estoppel are no longer defensible.61  In addition, a 
number of other factors have convinced many courts to abandon 
the traditional rule and liberalize collateral estoppel law to include 
criminal convictions.62  These factors are generally of a procedural 
nature,63 and chief among these is the higher burden of proof in 
criminal trials over that in civil trials.64  Because criminal 
convictions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than 
merely a fair preponderance of the evidence, courts can be more 
assured that estopping a civil litigant based on an issue in a 
criminal conviction is proper.65  Other procedural safeguards that 
are unique to criminal trials include “the requirement[] of . . . a 
unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by 
the state on appeal.”66  Thus, “[s]tability of judgments and 
expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal 
defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in 
conformity with these safeguards.”67  These procedural factors, the 
interest in promoting judicial economy, and the waning of the 
historical objections enumerated above all combine to convince 
many courts that using criminal convictions for collateral estoppel 
purposes is to be encouraged.68 
 
 60. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 560-63. 
 61. See id. at 560-63; supra notes 38-60 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 375 P.2d 439, 441 (Cal. 
1962) (stating that it is more fair to estop a civil litigant based on a prior criminal 
conviction than it is to estop him based on a prior civil judgment because of the 
increased safeguards present in criminal trials); Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 562. 
 63. See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 562. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Teitelbaum Furs, 375 P.2d at 441. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Teitelbaum Furs, 375 P.2d at 441; Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 560-63. 
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On the strength of these factors, the traditional rule has been 
eroded to the degree that it is now the exception, rather than the 
rule.69  The erosion of the traditional rule began in a landmark 
Virginia Supreme Court case in 1927.70  This case, Eagle, Star, & 
British Dominions Insurance Co. v. Heller, held that a criminal 
conviction can be given collateral estoppel effect, but only when 
the convicted party later attempts to profit from his crime in a civil 
suit.71  This exception to the traditional rule is now widely accepted, 
including in Minnesota.72  Indeed, this exception paved the way for 
the practice of giving criminal convictions collateral estoppel effect 
even when the convicted criminal does not seek to profit from his 
crime, an approach now followed by a majority of jurisdictions73 
and by the Restatement.74  Thus, before Reed, Minnesota recognized 
the “profit-from-the-crime” exception,75 but had not recognized the 
general collateral estoppel effect of a criminal conviction.76 
 
 69. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561. 
 70. Eagle, Star, & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 140 S.E. 314 (Va. 
1927). 
 71. Id at 321.  Max Heller was convicted of burning a stock of goods with the 
intent to injure the insurer of the goods.  He then collected the proceeds of the 
insurance policy on the goods.  The court went against the traditional rule and 
gave the criminal conviction collateral estoppel effect.  Id. 
 72. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 
(1968).  See also Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721 F.2d 506, 508-09 (5th Cir. 
1983) (discussing Texas’ use of criminal convictions for collateral estoppel 
purposes); United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 160 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing 
collateral estoppel in both criminal and civil contexts); Breeland v. Sec. Ins. Co. of 
New Haven, Conn., 421 F.2d 918, 922 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[t]he number of 
jurisdictions holding that a criminal conviction precludes litigation of the same 
issue in a civil suit is ever increasing”); May v. Oldfield, 698 F. Supp. 124, 126 (E.D. 
Ky. 1988) (noting recent cases allowing this type of collateral estoppel use); Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 481 N.E.2d 1356, 1359 (Mass. 1985) (overturning the 
traditional rule in Massachusetts); Hopps v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 506 A.2d 294, 297 
(N.H. 1985) (“there is a stronger rationale for applying collateral estoppel against 
a former criminal defendant than for applying it against a party to a prior civil 
case, since the criminal defendant has had the benefit of the presumption of 
innocence and the State’s obligation to prove any fact essential to the conviction 
beyond a reasonable doubt”); Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Cannon, 615 P.2d 1316, 
1319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (noting the procedural safeguards present in criminal 
trials and adopting the exception). 
 73. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561. 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 (1982). 
 75. See Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 558-59, 163 N.W.2d 289, 296. 
 76. See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 568. 
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2. The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Criminal Judgments: Reed’s 
Privity Problem 
It is clear that the trend in collateral estoppel law is to give 
criminal convictions collateral estoppel effect on the same basis as 
any other judgment.77  What is less clear, however, is how courts 
deal with the other problem in Reed: namely, whether or not a civil 
plaintiff that is the victim of a crime is in privity with the convicted 
perpetrator of that crime for collateral estoppel purposes.  It is 
illustrative to consider some of the reasons courts have cited for 
either finding privity or not finding privity in such cases. 
a. Courts Finding Privity 
Not all courts have faced the privity question presented by 
Reed.  It appears, however, that of those jurisdictions that have 
considered the issue, the majority have concluded that for 
insurance purposes, there is privity between a criminal defendant 
and the plaintiff that seeks to recover from the defendant in a 
subsequent civil trial.78  Courts that so hold focus primarily on the 
fact that the civil plaintiff’s right to the insurance proceeds derives 
from the same right of the insured criminal.79  These courts also 
emphasize that if the state had a direct-action statute,80 the 
 
 77. Id. at 560; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 78. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 385 (5th Cir. 1997); 
see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 596 A.2d 414, 421, 425 (Conn. 1991) 
(holding that privity is established when “the victim of an insured defendant 
derives her rights to collect insurance proceeds directly from the rights of the 
insured defendant”); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Yon, 796 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1990) (“[T]he wrongful-death claimants’ rights are only as good as the rights 
that [the convicted insured] can assert against Safeco under the insurance 
contract”); State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 38 (Me. 1991) (finding privity 
in such circumstances, at least for murder, attempted murder, and sexual abuse of 
a child convictions); Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 673 P.2d 1277, 1280-81 
(Mont. 1984) (finding that a criminal conviction has preclusive effects against a 
third party where the rights of the third party derived from those of the convict); 
New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 391 A.2d 923, 926 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1978) (stating that because the victim “stood in the shoes” of the insured, there 
was privity); In re Nassau Ins. Co., 577 N.E.2d 1039, 1040 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that 
a conviction for manslaughter collaterally estopped the executor of the victim 
from claiming insurance proceeds under the theory that the killer did not act 
intentionally); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Reuter, 700 P.2d 236, 241 (Or. 1985) 
(finding privity between a sexual assault victim and the perpetrator of the crime). 
 79. Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 384. 
 80. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 491 (defining “direct-action statute” as “[a] 
statute that grants an injured party direct standing to sue an insurer instead of the 
insured tortfeasor”). 
10
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assertion of privity between the civil plaintiff and the criminal 
defendant would fail.81  This is because the rights of the victim to 
the insurance proceeds would then not derive from the same right 
of the insured criminal.82 
b. Courts Finding No Privity 
Though they are a minority, several courts refuse to find privity 
between the insured criminal and the civil plaintiff seeking 
insurance proceeds from the criminal.83  These courts recognize 
that the right of the injured party to the insurance proceeds derives 
from the right of the insured to those proceeds.84  Nevertheless, in 
the interest of fairness, these courts rule that the civil plaintiff 
should not be precluded from showing a lack of intent.85 
Therefore, at the time Reed was decided, a majority of courts 
recognized that, in general, criminal convictions could have 
collateral estoppel effect.86  In addition, a majority of courts that 
had considered the issue had ruled that an insured criminal 
defendant is in privity with a subsequent civil plaintiff that seeks to 
recover from the defendant’s insurance policy.87  Before Reed, 
Minnesota had never considered the latter issue,88 and had not 
 
 81. See Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 384. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 2003); Mass. Prop. 
Ins. Underwriting Ass’n v. Norrington, 481 N.E.2d 1364, 1367-68 (Mass. 1985) 
(“Allowing the application of [collateral estoppel] against the insured, but not 
against the injured person, does no violence to the substantive principle that an 
injured party succeeds only to the insured’s rights against the insurer.”); see also 
Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098, 1103 (Cal. 1978) (refusing to apply 
collateral estoppel to a wrongful death judgment); Aid Ins. Co. (Mut.) v. Chrest, 
336 N.W.2d 437, 440-41 (Iowa 1983) (refusing to give a guilty plea in a criminal 
trial collateral estoppel effect despite the Iowa law that gives guilty pleas collateral 
estoppel effect against the criminal defendant); Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267 
A.2d 7, 14-15 (N.J. 1970); Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kollar, 578 A.2d 
1238, 1241 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (“An innocent third-party victim . . . 
should not be estopped from effectively recovering against a defendant and his 
insurer when the defendant and his insurer when the defendant, for whatever 
reason, elects to enter a plea of guilty.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Norrington, 481 N.E.2d at 1367. 
 85. Id.  “At [the] criminal trial, [the criminal defendant] in no sense 
represented the interests of [the civil plaintiff] . . . .  Furthermore, [the civil 
plaintiff] had no opportunity to participate in the criminal case.”  Id. 
 86. See supra Part II.B.1. and accompanying notes. 
 87. See supra Part II.B.2. and accompanying notes. 
 88. See Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 566-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002). 
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considered the former in thirty years.89 
 
III. THE REED DECISION 
 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
 
On May 25, 1999, Jordan Peschong, a one-year-old child, 
suffered a severe, life-threatening brain injury.90  At the time of his 
injury, Jordan was under the care of Janet Dawn Reed, who ran a 
daycare out of her home.91  Reed claimed that Jordan was injured 
when he fell in her kitchen while attempting to walk, and hit his 
head on the hard kitchen floor.92  Reed was charged with first-
degree assault93 and malicious punishment of a child.94  The state 
accused Reed of causing Jordan’s injuries by shaking him,95 whereas 
Reed continued to maintain that Jordan was injured in a fall.96  
Reed argued in the alternative that if shaking did in fact cause 
Jordan’s injuries, then she was nevertheless not guilty because she 
lacked intent to injure: she claimed that she shook Jordan in an 
attempt to revive him after his fall.97  During Reed’s criminal trial, 
the state presented testimony from seven experts showing that 
Jordan’s injuries were consistent with shaken baby syndrome, 
rather than a fall.98  The district court found that Reed did in fact 
 
 89. See Travelers Ins. Co. v.  Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 
(1968). 
 90. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Minn. 2003). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 556. 
 93. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530.  The assault charge was made pursuant to MINN. 
STAT. § 609.221(1) (2002).  This statute provides that “[w]hoever assaults another 
and inflicts great bodily harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more 
than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.”  Id. 
 94. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530.  The malicious punishment charge was made 
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.377(6) (2002), which provides that 
“[a] parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who, by an intentional act or series of 
intentional acts with respect to a child, evidences unreasonable force or cruel 
discipline that is excessive under the circumstances is guilty of malicious 
punishment of a child . . . .”  Id. § 609.377(1).  If this punishment results in great 
bodily harm, “the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 
ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.”  Id. § 
609.377(6). 
 95. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530. 
 96. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 556. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  Shaken baby syndrome is brain damage caused by the shaking, 
slamming, or throwing of a baby against an object.  WebMD Health, Shaken Baby 
Syndrome: Topic Overview, at http://my.webmd.com/hw/raising_a_family/ 
12
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shake Jordan, and that she did intend to injure him.99  Thus, Reed 
was found guilty of both the assault and malicious punishment 
charges at her criminal trial.100 
After the criminal trial, Jordan and his parents, Richard and 
Kimberly Peschong, filed a negligence suit in district court against 
Reed, seeking to recover for the injuries Jordan sustained at the 
hands of Reed.101  Reed turned the defense of this action over to 
her insurer, Illinois Farmers Insurance Company (Illinois 
Farmers).102  Illinois Farmers then initiated a declaratory judgment 
action in which Reed, the Peschongs, and Jordan’s doctors were all 
defendants.103 
The homeowner liability insurance policy at issue in the 
declaratory judgment action contained an intentional-acts 
exclusion clause.104  This clause excluded coverage for any bodily 
injury that is (a) “caused intentionally by or at the direction of an 
insured,” or (b) “results from any occurrence caused by an 
intentional act of any insured where the results are reasonably 
foreseeable.”105  In the policy, “occurrence” was defined as an 
accident that results in bodily injury.106  Illinois Farmers, on the 
strength of this clause, argued that it had no obligation to defend 
or indemnify Reed for Jordan’s injuries in the civil suit.107  Illinois 
Farmers asserted that because the question of whether or not Reed 
acted intentionally was answered in the affirmative in her criminal 
trial, the intentional-act exclusion applied, and the Peschongs were 
collaterally estopped from showing that Jordan’s injuries were 
 
hw169817.asp (last updated April 10, 2003).  This type of violent movement causes 
the baby’s brain to hit his skull, which tears blood vessels in the brain, causing 
hemorrhaging and swelling.  Id.  Young babies (one year and under) are more 
likely to be affected by the condition because of their large heads, weak necks, and 
developing brains.  Id.  Twenty to twenty-five percent of the time, shaking causes 
death; short of this, shaken babies can suffer life-long problems with seizures, 
spasticity, mental retardation, blindness, learning disabilities, and physical or 
emotional growth delays.  Id. 
 99. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 556. 
 100. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530.  The decision was handed down by the district 
court following a bench trial.  Id. 
 101. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 556. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
13
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caused by a negligent act.108 
Illinois Farmers then moved for summary judgment in the 
declaratory action based on the intentional-act exclusion in Reed’s 
policy.109  The district court denied the summary judgment motion 
and certified a question to the appellate courts.110  The question 
was: “[w]hen interpreting an intentional act exclusion of a 
common liability policy, does Minnesota law permit criminal 
convictions to be used for collateral estoppel purposes in a 
subsequent civil case in situations other that those . . . where the 
criminal defendant seeks to profit from [the] crime in a 
subsequent civil proceeding?”111 
B. The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision 
The court of appeals considered several issues in answering the 
certified question.112  First, the court decided that the certified 
question was properly before it pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil 
Appellate Procedure 103.03.113  Secondly, the court analyzed the 
Thompson decision,114 which established the precedent in Minnesota 
of allowing criminal convictions to estop issues in subsequent civil 
litigation where the criminal seeks to profit from the crime in the 
civil litigation.115  After noting several major changes in the law of 
collateral estoppel since the time Thompson was decided, the court 
of appeals decided that the estoppel effects of criminal convictions 
are not limited to situations in which the criminal seeks to profit 
from the crime, but rather should be determined on the same basis 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Minn. 2003). 
 111. Id.  The district court found that all other requirements of collateral 
estoppel were met.  Id.  Therefore, the district court believed that if the certified 
question were answered in the affirmative, then Illinois Farmers would be entitled 
to summary judgment.  Id. 
 112. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 557-65. 
 113. Id. at 557.  The court may hear an interlocutory appeal from a denial of 
summary judgment only if the question certified by the district court is “important 
and doubtful.”  Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(i) (2001).  A question is “important” 
if it “will have a statewide impact,” “it is likely to be reversed,” “it will terminate 
lengthy proceedings,” and “the harm inflicted on the parties by a wrong ruling . . . 
is substantial.”  Jostens, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 878, 884 
(Minn. 2000).  A question is “doubtful” if there is no controlling precedent and 
there is ground for a difference of opinion.  Id. at 884-85. 
 114. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 558-59.  The certified question from the district court 
made specific reference to Thompson.  Id. at 557. 
 115. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968). 
14
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as any other type of judgment.116  Thus, the court answered the 
certified question in the affirmative.117 
However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals did not end its 
analysis with answering the certified question.118  After deciding 
that criminal convictions have the same collateral estoppel effect as 
any other judgment, the court went on to apply the normal 
collateral estoppel analysis to determine whether or not the 
Peschongs were precluded from re-litigating the issue of Reed’s 
intent.119  This analysis required that four criteria be met before the 
judgment was given collateral estoppel effect: (1) the issue to be 
estopped must have been identical to one in a prior judgment; (2) 
there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) the 
estopped party must have been a party to, or in privity with a party 
to, the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party must have 
been given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the 
adjudicated issue.120  After considering these requirements, the 
court of appeals ruled that each was met, and the Peschongs were 
precluded from re-litigating the issue of Reed’s intent.121  Having 
decided both that criminal convictions should be given collateral 
estoppel effect, and that all of the elements of collateral estoppel 
were met, the court of appeals reversed the denial of Illinois 
 
 116. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 560-65. 
 117. Id. at 565. 
 118. Id.  The court noted that “[t]he general policies that might otherwise 
persuade us to limit our review to the certified question (to avoid piece-meal 
litigation, to conserve judicial resources, and to expedite trial proceedings) would 
not be served by remanding the matter to the district court . . . .”  Id. 
 119. Id. at 565-68. 
 120. Id. at 566 (quoting Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc, 452 N.W.2d 648, 650 
(Minn. 1990)). 
 121. Id. at 565-68.  The court of appeals first noted that the criminal conviction 
was, without doubt, a final judgment for collateral estoppel purposes.  Id. at 566.  
The Peschongs challenged the other three elements.  Id.  First, the Peschongs 
argued that the issue to be estopped was not the identical issue litigated in the 
criminal trial, because in the criminal trial the state proved that Reed intentionally 
shook Jordan, not that Reed intentionally caused Jordan’s injuries.  Id.  Both the 
district court and the court of appeals found this argument unconvincing.  Id. at 
566-67.  The Peschongs also argued that they were neither a party to, nor in privity 
with a party to, the criminal trial, and as such could not be estopped by it.  Id. at 
567.  The court of appeals ruled that because the Peschongs’ right to the 
insurance proceeds derived from Reed’s right to them, the Peschongs were in 
privity with Reed.  Id.  Finally, the Peschongs argued that they had not had a full 
and fair opportunity to be heard, and therefore could not be estopped.  Id.  Again, 
the court of appeals focused on Reed instead: because Reed had an opportunity to 
be heard, and the Peschongs were in privity with Reed, the Peschongs were 
estopped from re-litigating intent.  Id. at 568. 
15
Delbridge: Case Note: Civil Procedure—The Forest for the Trees: The Minnesot
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
7DELBRIDGE 3/29/2005  2:51:29 PM 
570 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
Farmers’ summary judgment motion and remanded for entry of 
judgment in favor of Illinois Farmers.122 
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the 
appellate court and held that Reed’s criminal conviction did not 
collaterally estop the Peschongs from attempting to show that her 
act was negligent, rather than intentional.123  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Reed court began its analysis where the court of 
appeals ended: by considering whether the four elements necessary 
for a judgment to be given collateral estoppel effect were met.124  In 
this analysis, the court used persuasive Massachusetts precedent: 
Massachusetts Property Insurance Underwriting Ass’n v. Norrington.125 
In its decision, the court emphasized the fact that the 
Peschongs had not been given a “full and fair opportunity to be 
heard.”126  Thus, the supreme court’s reversal was based on the 
finding that two of the requirements for collateral estoppel were 
not met: the party to be estopped by the prior judgment (the 
Peschong family) was not given a full and fair opportunity to be 
heard, and therefore, by implication,127 the Peschong family was 
neither a party to the criminal trial128 nor in privity with a party to 
that trial.129  The Reed court did recognize that “the right of the 
injured party to have recourse to the indemnity promised by the 
insurer rises no higher than the right of the insured.”130  Thus, the 
Peschongs’ right to proceeds of the Illinois Farmers policy derived 
from Reed’s right to those proceeds.131  Nevertheless, the Reed court 
 
 122. Id. at 568. 
 123. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 534 (Minn. 2003).  The 
court also noted that certified questions are subject to de novo review.  Id. at 531. 
 124. Id. at 531-32. 
 125. 481 N.E.2d 1364 (Mass. 1985). 
 126. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 534 (quoting Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil 
Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn. 1982)). 
 127. The “party or privity” requirement and the “full and fair opportunity to 
be heard” requirement are closely analogous, and are likely to succeed or fail en 
masse.  Indeed, the Massachusetts court in Norrington combined the two into one 
element, and enumerated only three elements.  See Mass. Prop. Ins. Underwriting 
Ass’n v. Norrington, 481 N.E.2d 1364, 1366 (Mass. 1985). 
 128. See Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 533.  The parties to the criminal trial were the 
State of Minnesota and Reed.  Id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. (quoting Norrington, 481 N.E.2d at 1367). 
 131. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion as to this 
point.  See Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 
16
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held that this did not constitute privity between the Peschongs and 
Reed.132  It was on this basis that the Reed court reversed the court 
of appeals and remanded the matter to the district court for 
further proceedings.133 
The supreme court did not, however, answer the certified 
question: whether a criminal conviction can generally be used for 
collateral estoppel purposes.134  Thus, there are two important 
factors to the Reed decision: the analysis of what constitutes privity135 
and the failure to address the court of appeals’ holding that 
criminal trials may be used for collateral estoppel purposes.136 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE REED DECISION 
The Reed decision is important to the development of 
Minnesota collateral estoppel law both in its correct interpretation 
of how privity should be defined as well as its lack of clarity on the 
issue of the general collateral estoppel effect of a criminal 
conviction. 
A. The Privity Issue 
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly ruled on the privity 
issue in Reed, finding that the Peschongs were not in privity with 
Janet Reed, despite the fact that the Peschongs’ right to the 
insurance proceeds derived from Reed’s right to those proceeds.137  
This result appears to place Minnesota among the minority of 
courts that have considered the issue.138  The Reed court followed 
 
2002). 
 132. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 533.  It is this conclusion that constitutes the chief 
disagreement between the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion and that of the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals.  See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 567-68. 
 133. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 533-34. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 533-34. 
 136. Id.  See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561 (stating that it is now commonly accepted 
in many jurisdictions that dispositions of criminal cases may be used for collateral 
estoppel purposes in subsequent civil litigation). 
 137. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530. 
 138. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 386 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that decisions finding no privity in situations like those in Reed are both 
less numerous and less recent than those finding privity).  Fullerton went one step 
further in the liberal application of collateral estoppel: it found that a guilty plea in 
a criminal case could be given preclusive effect because it was sufficient to meet 
the “actually litigated” requirement of collateral estoppel.  Id.  This approach may 
be gaining adherents.  See id. at 378-81.  Nonetheless, this approach calls into 
17
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persuasive Massachusetts precedent in deciding the privity issue.139  
The Massachusetts court, in dealing with facts similar to those in 
Reed, correctly focused on the fact that the party to be estopped had 
no opportunity to participate in the criminal case.140  In addition to 
the Massachusetts case, persuasive precedent provided by the 
Restatement also informed the Reed decision on the privity issue.141 
1. Policy Concerns Supporting the Reed Decision 
“The term ‘privity’ is one of those conclusory words that 
provides little insight into the underlying policies.”142  Therefore, 
an analysis of whether privity exists in cases such as Reed requires 
more than a simple survey of persuasive precedent; it is necessary to 
consider the underlying policy ramifications as well.  Of primary 
importance are due process concerns.  Though Reed, at her 
criminal trial, and the Peschongs, at their civil trial, were both 
interested in showing a lack of intent by Reed, “it create[ed] no 
privity between two parties that, as litigants in two different suits, 
they happen[ed] to be interested in proving or disproving the same 
facts.”143  Thus, unless the Peschongs’ interests were actually 
litigated at the criminal trial, to deny them the right to litigate 
Reed’s intent at the civil trial would be a violation of due process.144 
 
question both the “actually litigated” requirement of collateral estoppel as well as 
the “party or in privity” requirement. 
 139. Mass. Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n v. Norrington, 481 N.E.2d 1364 
(Mass. 1985) (finding no privity between a convicted murderer and the next of kin 
of the murder victim). 
 140. Id. at 1366-68. 
 141. Id. at 1367. 
D inflicts a blow on X as a result of which X dies.  D is convicted of 
intentional homicide.  P, administrator of X’s estate, brings an action 
against D for wrongful death, alleging D’s act was negligent.  I had 
previously issued a policy of liability insurance to D, insuring liability for 
D’s negligent acts but excluding intentional acts.  In P’s action against D, 
P is not precluded by the criminal conviction from showing that D’s act was 
negligent rather than intentional. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. F, illus. 10 (1982) (emphasis 
added).  The Restatement also defines privity in several other ways: as it relates to 
wrongful death statutes; between family members with separate causes of action 
derived from one injury; and between members of a partnership based on a single 
injury.  Id. §§ 46, 48, 60.  None of these examples of privity apply to the instant 
situation. 
 142. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 1174. 
 143. Norrington, 481 N.E.2d at 1367 (quoting Sturbridge v. Franklin, 35 N.E. 
669 (Mass. 1893)). 
 144. “It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant 
18
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Another policy concern worthy of note is the fact that no 
undue burden will be placed on the insurer by not allowing it to 
use collateral estoppel because it has not previously had to litigate 
the issue of the insured’s intent.145  Therefore, Illinois Farmers is 
not prejudiced in any way by having to litigate Reed’s intent at the 
civil trial. 
Finally, several fairness issues would be raised by not allowing 
the Peschongs to litigate the issue of Reed’s intent.  For example, 
though both Janet Reed and the Peschongs were interested in 
showing Reed’s lack of intent, it is quite possible that Reed would 
have expended more effort attempting to prove that she did not 
shake Jordan to begin with than in attempting to prove that she did 
so unintentionally.146  Thus, it is possible that Reed’s intent was not 
litigated fully.  Another fairness concern is the possibility that Reed 
may have been represented by less able counsel than the 
Peschongs.147  If this were the case, it would be unfair to saddle the 
Peschongs with the results of Reed’s less-than-adequate counsel.  In 
addition, the Peschongs did not have the opportunity either to 
cross-examine Reed or to present their own evidence and 
experts.148  Finally, the Fifth Amendment right of a criminal 
defendant to not testify, as contrasted against the negative 
inference that can be drawn from the refusal of a defendant to 
testify in a civil case, may have a large effect on the result.149  These 
issues all dictate the conclusion that the Reed court was correct in its 
definition of privity. 
 
who . . . has never had an opportunity to be heard.”  Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of 
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). 
 145. See Norrington, 481 N.E.2d at 1368.  The state had to litigate the issue of 
intent at the criminal trial; the insurance company did not.  Id. 
 146. An illustration from the field of tort law may be helpful in clarifying this 
point.  The elements of battery are (a) acting with the intent to cause a harmful or 
offensive contact with another, and (b) a harmful or offensive contact occurs.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).  Both elements are necessary in 
order for there to have been a battery.  Id.  Therefore, both elements would be 
said to have been “fully litigated” at a criminal trial.  However, it is probable that 
the defendant would focus more energy on disproving one element or the other.  
Therefore, it seems unfair to hold a third party to the result of the prior litigation 
when perhaps a more vigorous litigation of the intent issue would have yielded a 
contrary result. 
 147. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 552, 163 N.W.2d 289, 
292 (1968). 
 148. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Minn. 2003). 
 149. Id. 
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2. Policy Concerns Arguing Against the Reed Decision 
Weighed against the factors enumerated above150 are policies 
concerned with reducing the needless expenditure of resources.151  
While it is true that more of the judicial system’s resources will be 
expended by not applying collateral estoppel in cases like Reed, the 
due process considerations must take precedent over judicial 
economy concerns. 
Another policy issue that argues against the Reed decision is the 
possibility that if the Peschongs are successful in proving that Reed 
acted negligently, that result would be inconsistent with the 
criminal trial and would reflect poorly on the judicial system.152  
This concern should not be overstated, however.  As noted above, it 
is quite possible that Reed did not focus on proving her lack of 
intent during her criminal trial, but rather on proving that she did 
not shake Jordan.153  Therefore, a negligence finding in the civil 
trial would not be altogether inconsistent with the result of the 
criminal trial. 
Because there are only a few minor policy concerns arguing 
against its decision, the Reed court was correct in protecting the 
Peschongs’ right to due process by finding that they were not in 
privity with Reed. 
B. The General Collateral Estoppel Effect of Criminal Convictions 
The second important aspect of Reed, and the one which the 
court failed to discuss, is its treatment of the general issue of 
whether a criminal conviction can operate as an estoppel to 
subsequent civil litigation.  In reversing the court of appeals based 
on the lack of privity, the Minnesota Supreme Court left the 
collateral estoppel effect of a criminal conviction murky.154  
 
 150. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 151. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).  “Collateral 
estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of 
protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same 
party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless 
litigation.” Id. 
 152. See Travelers Ins. Co., 281 Minn. at 555, 163 N.W.2d at 294 (“[T]o permit a 
retrial of the facts and issues already determined in the criminal proceeding would 
be an imposition on the courts and only tend to embarrass or bring into disrepute 
the judicial process.”). 
 153. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 154. See generally supra text accompanying notes 33-76 (discussing the 
traditional approach to, and historical development of, the collateral estoppel 
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Without a clear directive on this issue, practitioners are left in the 
dark as to whether a criminal conviction will be given full collateral 
estoppel effect (where the other requirements of collateral 
estoppel are met) or whether the effect is limited to the “profit-
from-the-crime” exception.155  Thus, the Reed court should have 
taken a position on this issue, even though it was not necessary to 
the decision.  To do so would not have been inappropriate, as the 
certified question from the district court asked exactly this 
question.156 
Had the Minnesota Supreme Court made a ruling on the 
general collateral estoppel effect of a criminal conviction, that 
ruling would not have been necessary to the result, and would 
therefore have been dictum.157  However, it is important to note the 
difference between “obiter dictum” and “judicial dictum.”158  The 
latter is “an expression of opinion on a question directly involved 
and argued by counsel though not entirely necessary to the 
decision.”159  Such an expression is “entitled to much greater weight 
than mere obiter dictum and should not be lightly disregarded.”160  
The question of whether criminal convictions can be used for 
collateral estoppel purposes was certainly argued by counsel, and 
the court of appeals considered this question very carefully.161  
Therefore, if the Reed court had expressed an opinion on the issue, 
that opinion would have been judicial dictum, and collateral 
estoppel law in Minnesota would be clearer than it is now.162 
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not make an expression of 
its opinion on the matter, however, so we are left with the court of 
 
effect of criminal judgments in civil cases). 
 155. See Travelers Ins. Co., 281 Minn. at 552, 163 N.W.2d at 292 (recognizing the 
“profit-from-the-crime” exception as one instance in which a criminal conviction is 
given collateral estoppel effect). 
 156. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Minn. 2003). 
 157. More properly called “obiter dictum,” dictum is defined as “[a] judicial 
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to 
the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be 
considered persuasive).” BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 1102. 
 158. See 43 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Stare Decisis § 1.03 (4th ed. 1999). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 560-64 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 162. See 43 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Stare Decisis § 1.03 (4th ed. 1999); see also 
State v. Rainer, 258 Minn. 168, 177, 103 N.W.2d 389, 396 (1960) (stating that 
judicial dictum is the “expression of the court . . . and as such is entitled to much 
greater weight than mere obiter dictum and should not be lightly disregarded”). 
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appeals’ opinion.  For this reason, it is important to consider the 
value of this opinion after being reversed by the supreme court.  
Though its reversal certainly relegates the court of appeals’ opinion 
to the status of dubious precedent, it probably does retain some 
degree of precedential value.163  Indeed, because the supreme court 
reversed the court of appeals on the privity issue rather than on the 
issue of the general collateral estoppel effect of criminal 
convictions, the appellate opinion on this point may be the law in 
Minnesota.  Of course, this will not be certain until a Minnesota 
court again rules on the issue. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Reed, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that there is no 
privity between an insured criminal and a litigant who sues the 
criminal in a civil suit.164  This decision allows the civil plaintiff to 
re-litigate the criminal’s intent, or lack of intent, and thereby seek 
to collect from the criminal’s liability insurer despite an intentional 
act exemption clause.165  Though this places Minnesota among the 
minority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue,166 it is the 
correct decision.  The Reed court correctly places the right to due 
process above judicial economy concerns. 
The court is not as successful, however, in its treatment of the 
question of whether a criminal conviction will generally be given 
collateral estoppel effect.  In short, the court gives this issue no 
treatment at all, despite the fact that it was discussed at length in 
the court of appeals opinion that the court reversed.  Though 
taking a stance on this issue would have been dicta,167 it nonetheless 
would have been dicta that cleared up what is currently a murky 
area in Minnesota procedural law. 
 
 163. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 7429R, 2002 WL 
1077735, at *6 (Minn. Tax Ct. May 15, 2002) (citing United States v. L.A. Tucker 
Truck Lanes, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) for the proposition that “an issue neither 
raised in briefs or argument nor discussed in the opinion is not binding precedent 
on that legal point”).  Because the supreme court did not discuss the general issue 
of whether collateral estoppel effect should be given to criminal convictions, it can 
at least be said that its opinion is not binding on that point, and therefore did not 
reverse that portion of the court of appeals’ decision. 
 164. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 531. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 386 (5th Cir. 
1997) (stating that decisions finding no privity in situations like those in Reed are 
both less numerous and less recent than those finding privity). 
 167. See Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529. 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/7
7DELBRIDGE 3/29/2005  2:51:29 PM 
2004] THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT 577 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has inaugurated a successful 
rule of law for a very specific class of cases: those in which a 
convicted criminal with an insurance policy containing an 
intentional-acts exclusion clause is subsequently sued for harm 
resulting from his or her crime.168  However, the court has failed to 
rule on the broader issue of whether a criminal conviction can 
generally serve to collaterally estop subsequent civil litigation.169  
Thus, in Reed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has lost sight of the 
forest for the trees. 
 
 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
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